As the 21st century unfolds, the dawn of a new global order is taking root with the emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a new player in global politics and the international economy. The speed and the magnitude of China’s economic growth and military modernization becomes not only a subject of great intellectual inquiry in contemporary literature, but also a heated political debate dominated by the global mass media from daily newspapers to television talk shows. Despite the circulation of great volumes of literature and rhetoric of political speculations about the implications of a rising China, the reality is still shrouded in mystery, how China conducts herself in the international community with its newly found global power? Answering this question is not an easy task, because of the hypothetical nature of this question, there is no right or wrong answer. Therefore, the focus of this article is sorely based on historical facts and events. Based on historical analysis, the author examines China’s role in the future global order. If the widely believe mantra, “history repeats itself” is true; I have ample reason and evidence to make a personal inquiry into the nature of China’s conduct in the foreseeable global order. The inquiry of this subject is influenced by Warren I. Cohen’s book, “East Asia At The Center” and Cohen’s historical illustration of China’s role and conduct in international system in East Asia.
Before jump to the actual narrative of historical analysis, I would like to introduce readers to two possible explanations from the perspective of international relations on this issue. This might help to give readers a broader perspective on understanding the implications of China’s rise. Firstly, from the realist doctrine, the rise of China is an actual threat to the contemporary Western oriented international order which is designed on the interests of the West. The realist theory defines state as a self-interested entity constantly struggling against one another in an anarchic international system. Therefore it is reasonable to argue that China will gradually impose change in the current international order to promote and secure its own interests if China becomes an uncontested power player. Proponents of this doctrine claim credit for this argument based on current Chinese leaders’ unpleasant and hostile attitude towards the West, particularly, China’s constant clash with human rights and growing domestic problems.
Secondly, from the liberalist perspective, China is less likely to engage in hostile actions and pose threat to the contemporary international order. Because of the existence of (a loose) global regime under the United Nations, the behavior of states is monitored through international norms and standards. More importantly, the degree of economic integration today demands effective cooperation and good relations among the actors in the international system. From the economic point of view, China’s growing economic integration with West and its export oriented market reinforces good relations with other states and execution of international norms. It emphasizes on institutional mechanism and rule of law in regulation of relations between states to prevent conflicts and maintain international order. Given the tragic circumstances of continuous wars and conflicts in the course of human history, the foundation of the United Nations after World War II marked an epoch of relative peace. The UN’s success in reducing major wars between states and the decolonization campaign gives credential to the proponents of this theory. Apart from economy, the culture and type of government are also important factors in determining the behavior of a state. However, critics might dismiss the liberal optimism based on China’s distinct culture and its communist regime.
Going back to the history of China’s early civilization, Cohen argues an existence of an international system in East Asia in period between 4th century and 13th century. During these periods, Chinese civilization was at its peak and China had played a dominant role in the region’s economic, diplomatic and political relations. The careful study of China’s conduct in this context might give us a theoretical framework under which we can make possible predictions and speculations about China’s future conduct. At the same time the author recognizes the differences in environmental setting, ideology and structure of governance between today’s PRC and the past empires.
The so called golden ages of Chinese glories and might never came through peace but rather through the expense of many lives and the bloodsheds of thousands on the battlefield. Much of those early periods of Chinese civilization were largely characterized by warfare and conquest. For example, the unification of China during these periods of early history was never achieved through peace and agreement, but solely, (identical to their western brothers and sisters), through warfare and conquest. This is evidence that China’s earlier emperors were not much different from any other emperors of the world. As Cohen argues, “Like all other world’s empires, the Chinese Empire was based on conquest, the subjugation of militarily inferior peoples whom the Chinese portrayed as subhuman to justify their own action” (p.2, 2000). The quest for power and glory is arguably an innate human characteristic as Machiavelli put in his work The Prince. This quest seems to have no cultural and ideological barriers and it is common in most cultures we study. Therefore, the cultural factor is largely irrelevant to interpret the behavior of state in this context. The enhancement of state power was the sole concern of the emperor and his advisors. For example, Shang Yung, known as Lord Shang in the 4th century devised strategies of acquiring wealth and power necessary to achieve control in anarchic world (p.15, 2000).
One of the most glorious times in ancient Chinese civilization was during the Tang Dynasty (618-907). Tang Dynasty’s glamor and splendor were largely achieved through forced conquest and battle against the neighboring states. As Cohen argues, “Physically, the empire expanded aggressively, imposing Chinese culture forcibly on peoples to the north, south, east and west” (p.61, 2000). China’s military might and offensive aggressions were clearly demonstrated during the period with constant massive military offense against competing forces like Korea, Japan and Tibet. For example, during 610 to 612, China had launched a massive military offensive against Koguryo, but failed to bring the king of Koguryo to the Chinese court to pay homage (p.66, 2000). Similar attacks were made against other states including Japan and Turks.
To secure China’s interests and influence over the periphery states, a tributary system was introduced as a diplomatic channel through which interactions between superior China and inferior periphery states were made. The tributary system had been practiced throughout the various periods of Chinese empires. Cohen argues, Tributary system was at once a formula for diplomatic intercourse, a symbol of peace and friendship between unequal sovereign states (p.60, 2000). The notion of superior Chinese civilization is embedded deep within Chinese culture and mindsets. These cultural beliefs have strong psychological implications on the behavior and attitude of Chinese people. For example, Chinese emperors often justified their subjugation and conquest of other states by labeling others as inferior to China. This kind of behavioral pattern and psychological mindset seems still strong in Chinese society. Considering the CPP’s invasion of Tibet, CPP justifies its illegal invasion as superior liberation of inferior Tibet from the yoke of the barbaric feudal system. By and large, the tributary system reflects China’s continuous domination and influence over the tributary states. Cohen clearly states that the system of tributary particularly found useful to Chinese when “they lacked the will or the power to crush or occupy another states” (p.60, 2000). The tributary system lends us evidence about the expansionist behavior and attitude of China during these imperial periods of China’s splendor.
Changing tone of China’s of foreign policy:
Until recently, China has kept herself quiet in the international spotlight to prevent criticism about its repressive domestic policies and questionable human rights record. When dealing with issues of international concern, China tends to push herself away from the mess and attempts to keep a low profile on these issues. But its new found status and confidence changed her self-image and conduct regarding international issues. As many western experts on China argue that China’s foreign policy is becoming more assertive. For example, Edward Carr points out three incidents that illustrate or projects China’s growing assertiveness. First, when North Korea provocatively sank South Korea navy ship near Yellow Sea and killed more than hundred sailors, China failed to condemned North Korea’s misconduct and provocation. Since North Korea is China’s close ally in the region, China did not punish North Korea’s action even if America and international community are frustrated and warned for possible retaliation. Second, when the Japanese government arrested Chinese fishermen for illegal straying into Japanese territorial water, China boldly responded to Japan’s action by arresting some Japanese businessmen and threaten to block vital rare earth materials use in Japanese industries. Third, Beijing responds to Washington’s warning against its policy to keep her currency artificially low. When President Barack Obama warned China about possible imposition of tariff on China’s export goods, China boldly respond that such action will face similar retaliation. Fourth, China today pursues stick and carrot policies toward other states. As Richard Armitage, the Secretary of State under Bush administration once argued that the “smiling diplomacy is over” when dealing with China. This is clear from China’s reaction to the West while dealing with Tibetan issue and Dalai Lama. Recently, China begins to pursue a more aggressive policy regarding the issue of Tibet. For example, Sino-French and Sino-German rows over Dalai Lama’s visit. When French president met Dalai Lama during his visit to France, China took a punitive measure against France by delaying an economic submits. Similarly, China protested to Barack Obama when he decided to meet Dalai Lama at White House last year. The muscular tone of China’s foreign policy is clearly demonstrated by China’s reaction to Nobel Community’s decision to award Nobel Peace Prize to jailed Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. China not only stopped Lu’s families and closed friends from attending the ceremony to collect the prize, but also pushed away 16 countries from the ceremony. Christopher Bodden, in his recent article published on phayul website argues that “China showed more muscular foreign policy in 2010 that called into question Beijing promise of a peaceful rise”. These reflect a changing attitude of China toward international community at large and America in particular. Significance of the change in China’s attitude is that China will assert its power whenever its interests are at stake. Therefore we can neither expect a peaceful China as many over-optimists believe nor an aggressor as many people in the West fear. China’s aggression will be largely determined by the clash of interests and relations with contenting powers.
China’s military assessment:
China’s rapid military modernization and growing budget spending is one the causes of tension and fear in the West. More particularly, China’s opaque nature of its military secrecy provokes suspicion and mistrust. When China begins to open the door of modernization under Deng Xiaoping, he did not envision the modernization of the People Liberation Army (PLA) before complete modernization of other social spheres. His vision of new China has changed with change in the agendas of modernization. After his death, new Chinese leaders had quickly reassessed the undergoing modernization program and gave priority to military instead of farming, education and industry. Although, China achieved a degree of modernization in industry but farming and education are still lacking behind. China’s immediate step in military modernization reflects sense of urgency and concern about its security and power hunger. According to global Security Organization, Chinese defense spending has increased by an average of 12.9 percent every year since 1989 when Beijing launched its ambitious military modernization program. This is a huge increase in military budget as compared with average annual GDP growth of 9.2 percent. Concerning the Beijing’s three areas of military modernization, today China has created “the most active land-based ballistic and cruise-missile program in the world” (Carr, 2010). China is also developing first anti-ballistic ship missile in the world with ever growing number and capability of its submarines. Currently China has 66 submarine fleets and about 1.100 short range ballistic missile facing Taiwan. In terms of space, China successfully launched its rockets in the space and able to put its satellite into orbit. Its new breeds of modern aircrafts are equipped with capability to launch nuclear warheads and conventional ballistic missiles. Although China is not compatible with American military superiority, but China’s fast track military modernization and increasing defense spending will challenge America in the future. For example, massive military and weapon display during the 50thanniversary of CPP was an evidence of China’s power projection to the outside world.
By inquiring into the history of China’s imperial past and behavior and attitude of PRC today, the author concludes that the China will play global role in its own term like other great powers in the past. Many people believe that China’s attitude will change if much waited political reform; democracy is realized. The transition to democracy definitely improves China’s human rights records but it does not bring large scale change on China’s behavior as player in global theater. A common sense can easily depict from the behavior of the United States as unchallenged super power after the collapsed of Soviet Union. Despite the champion of democratic value and the defender of human rights, the United States chose to ignore international obligations after September 11 attack. The United States’ decision to withdraw from the ICC as a party and its practice of torture reflects that national interest trumps over international obligations. If necessary China will and shall impose changes in current global order in order to advance its own interests. Given the evidence of China as a long time vocal critic of the West and its continuous alliance with rogue states, China will not tolerate the order that has little respect and value to her. Therefore international order will continuously change with shifting tectonic of power balance.
Engaging thought 
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