The question is, has Tibet been historically a part of China since the Tang dynasty as the Chinese government claims in its official White Paper? Although, answering this question is not a simple and easy one, rather it is a complicated one. This complication of relationships between Tibet and China arises not due to lack of historical evidences and records; rather it is largely due to Tibet’s long isolation to the outside world. Tibet is often known as the “forbidden kingdom” to the outside world due to its centuries of isolation without economic or diplomatic relations with many of countries except its close neighboring countries such as Nepal, Bhutan, Mongol, India and China. China’s historical claim of sovereignty over Tibet rests on four historical events or periods, Tang dynasty (618-907), Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and Seventeen Point Agreement between Tibet and China in 1951. In this paper, the author would like to examine the relations between Tibet and China during each period and how China’s claim of Tibet is consistent with narrative of history itself.
According to China’s official white paper, Tibet was unified into Chinese territory through marriage between Tibetan Tubo King Songtsen Gampo and Tang princess, Wen Cheng. The marriage between Tibetan Songtsen Gampo and princess Wen Ching was historically consistent with both Chinese and Tibetan history. However, the unification or incorporation of Tibetan territory into China bears no historical evidences and lacks legal and logical legitimacy. This is because Tibetan Tubo King Songsten Gampo married not only Tang princess Wen Cheng, but he also married Nepali princess Bhrikuti Devi. The question here at stake is that, if China claims its sovereignty over Tibet on the ground of marriage between princess Wen Cheng and Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo, can also Nepal claim sovereignty over Tibet on the same ground of marriage? Therefore, a mere marriage event can not be a determining factor for China’s sovereignty over Tibet.
If we closely examine the nature of marriage, there is clear historical evidence that the intention of marriage was not to integrate Tibet into Chinese territory or unification with China as the Chinese official paper often claims. According to well known Tibetan historian Dawa Norbu, Tang emperor’s acceptance of marriage was merely to fathom war and conflict between two states as both Tibet and China’s relations at the time were largely characterized by conflicts. As he argued, “matrimonial alliances were intricately connected with the strategic problem of war and peace (p.37, 2001). A number of treaties made between Chinese Tang dynasty and Tibetan King Emperor Songtsen Gampo demonstrated the conflicting nature of Sino-Tibet relations at the time.
Particularly, Tibetan fighting power and military superiority at the time compelled the Tang emperor to give his daughter to Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo. As Tibetan tribes had been the greatest threat to Chinese security and sense of superiority, and more than any nomad tribes, Tibetans competed against China for territorial expansion. For example, during the Tang and Tubo period, nine peace treaties had signed between Tibet and China. Particularly, the treaty of 821/822 D Tang and Tubo recognized each other as equal sovereign state with a clear sense of territory demarcation as it stated, “All the east is the country of Great China. All to the west is country of Great Tibet” (Norbu, p.37, 2001)
Second, China argues that Tibet officially integrated into Chinese territory under theYuan dynasty which was established by Mongol emperor, khublai Khan. In order to understand the historical complexities between Tibet and China, we have to explore the relations between Tibet and Mongol emperors. Chinese communist historians often ignore the special relations between Mongol emperors and Tibet. The special spiritual connection between Tibet and Mongol during 13th century was a key to understanding the nature of Mongol invasion of Tibet. It is consistent with many historians that Tibet and Mongol relations at the time were characterized by patron and priest relationship. Mongol emperor, Ghengis Khan and Khublai Khan highly respected Tibetan Buddhist scholars, namely lamas (spiritual teacher) and sought their guidance and spiritual advices. The Buddhist factor was important to the relationships between Mongol and Tibet and Tibet and China itself. As Norbu argued,
“There was political dimension but it was tempered, moderate, softened and eased by what appears to have been the religious belief of the early Mongol emperors such as Godan and Khublai Khan, both of whom were covered to Buddhism by two Sakya lamas, Sakya Pandita (1182-1251) and Choegyal Phagpa (1230-80)” (p.44, 2001).
The religious dimension is an important factor to understanding the underlying complexities of relations between Tibet and China. The priest-patron relation also existed between Tibetan Buddhist scholars (lamas) and Chinese imperials throughout the later Chinese imperials.
In short, Mongol emperors of Yuan dynasty gave special political concessions to Tibet on the grounds of religious belief and spiritual connection with Tibetan lamas. As many Tibetan historical records reveal Mongol did not directly rule Tibet as it did in China during Yuan dynasty. Mongol emperors during Yuan dynasty indirectly ruled Tibet through the medium of Sakya Lamas. Tibetan government has established its power in Sakya which directly rule the whole U-Tsang province and Nyagri for 114 years. This was the first centralized government established with support of Mongol emperor after the downfall of the Btsan state. In short, this resulted inYuan dynasty’s indirect rule of Tibet with full self administration and self rule by Tibetan elites and little or no interference from China. As Bhattacharya argues “Norbu clearly demonstrates that the priest-patron relations between the Mongols and lamas emerged 39 years before the Yuan imperial rule in China, thus discounting the Chinese claims on Tibet as part of Yuan and therefore part of PRC (Tibet and the Middle Kingdom, p.2313). Author John Keay comes to a similar conclusion in his book “China: a history”. He argues “Like Taiwan, and despite vague claims by the Chinese Yuan dynasty, Tibet had never been administratively part of any Chinese empire” (p.442). Elliot Sperling also argues,
The idea that Tibet became part of China in the 13th century is a very recent construction. In the early part of the 20th century, Chinese writers generally dated the annexation of Tibet to the 18th century. They described Tibet’s status under the Qing with a term that designates a “feudal dependency,” not an integral part of a country. And that’s because Tibet was ruled as such, within the empires of the Mongols and the Manchus. When the Qing dynasty collapsed in 1911, Tibet became independent once more (New York Times, p. 1).
It is seemly clear that Chinese communist historians distort the historical realities for the sake of ad hoc political purpose. As mentioned in the introduction, many Communist historians ignore some of the fundamental factors and jump into blunt political conclusions. For example, Mongol invasion of Tibet has simply taken as China’s exercise of sovereignty over Tibet without considering the relation between Mongol emperors and Tibet. More significantly, if China claims its sovereignty over Tibet merely on the grounds of Mongol influence in Tibet during Yuan dynasty, why can’t China claim its sovereignty over all territories both in East and South Asia that fall into Mongol invasion during Yuan dynasty?
Thirdly, the Chinese exercised sovereignty over Tibet in an unbroken line since the Yuan dynasty. According to the official White Paper released by Information Office of the state council in 1992, when Yuan dynasty collapsed, successive Ming dynasty inherited the right to rule Tibet continuously. This argument does not hold the truth of history. Tibet became a sovereign state after the collapse of Yuan dynasty and it ceased to pay tribute to China as it did to Yuan dynasty under Mongol rule. However, Kham and Amdo region continue to maintain tribute-cum-trade relations with Ming Court due to its geographical proximity and being free from Lhasa control. This tribute-cum-trade relation between Ming dynasty and Eastern Tibet does not constitute China’s sovereignty over Tibet. As in 1642, Fifth Dalai Lama proclaimed Tibet’s independence by establishing the Gadhen Pokdang government with help of Mongol. Ming dynasty has no political control over the central government in Lhasa. However, Chinese communist historians insist that Tibet was subject to Ming rule on the grounds of tribute-cum-trade relations with eastern Tibet. The evidence gives ample credit to Tibet’s assertion that Tibet was not territorially part of the Ming dynasty. According to Norbu’s book ‘China’s Tibet Policy’, the Chinese map drew by Wang Fen, a legal officer in Ming court did not include Tibet as a part of Ming dynasty’s 15 provinces (p.64, 2001).
Fourthly, Communist historians assert that Tibet was fully and politically integrated into the territory by signing of the ‘Seventeen Points Agreement’ between Tibet and China in 1951. From the Tibetan side, Seven Points Agreement is not a legally binding treaty as it was signed under the Chinese force and coercion. China uses it as stepping stone to legitimize its invasion of Tibet in the international community. From the perspective of international law, treaty cannot be valid unless it is signed with the agreement of both parties with equal footing. Thus, Seventeen Points Agreement was not a legally binding agreement between Tibet and China.
With a fair minded analysis of historical relations between Tibet and China, historians often agree with and come to a similar conclusion that Tibet hasn’t been a historically administrative part of China until communist invasion in 1959. At the same time, author also acknowledges the complexity of relations between Tibet and China and China’s various degrees of influences over Tibet. However, author rejects the communist historians’ assumption that Tibet has been a part of China since Tang dynasty and territorially incorporated during Yuan dynasty. Following the Confucius rule in China, the status of Tibet is a tributary which does not amount to China’s sovereignty rather potential actor in international relations. China’s claim of Tibet is more of a recent construction in the early nineteenth century influenced by the Western expansionist movement. Owing to Tibet’s geographical proximity to China and strategic security importance, China was compelled to resort means to claim its sovereignty over Tibet. Particularly, early 1990s, the British colonial expansion in South Asia and trade ambition in Tibet exasperated China’s concern over its security.
Therefore the author found it is worth studying the Sino-Tibetan historical relations in our academic literature to reduce the gap of understanding between Tibetan scholars and Chinese scholars in the future. Author is also surprised by the degree of twisted facts and historical manipulations found in current Chinese academic literature directed by the Communist Party. For example, the Chinese government’s official White Paper on Tibet is merely a piece of political propaganda with no factual historical evidences. Hence the author cautions that the circulation of such propagandist literature in Chinese academia can do more harm than good to Sino-Tibetan relations and Chinese society in particular.
Reference and bibliography:
1 China’s Tibet Policy, Dawa Norbu, 2001, Published by Curzon Press
2 Don’t know much about Tibetan History, Ellot Sparling, 2008, New York Times
Engaging thought 